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MOTTO 
 َلﺎَﻗ ﺎَﻤُﻬْﻨَﻋ ﷲا ﻲﺿر ْﺮَﻤُﻋ ِﻦْﺑا ْﻦَﻋ : َلﺎَﻘَﻓ ﱠﻲَﺒِﻜْﻨَﻤِﺑ ﻢﻠﺳو ﻪﻴﻠﻋ ﷲا ﻰﻠﺻ ِﷲا ُلْﻮُﺳَر َﺬَﺧَأ : ْﻦُآ
 ٍﻞْﻴِﺒَﺳ ُﺮِﺑﺎَﻋ ْوَأ ٌﺐْﻳِﺮَﻏ َﻚﱠﻧَﺄَآ ﺎَﻴْﻧﱡﺪﻟا ﻲِﻓ . ُلْﻮُﻘَﻳ ﺎَﻤُﻬْﻨَﻋ ُﷲا َﻲِﺿَر َﺮَﻤُﻋ ُﻦْﺑا َنَﺎآَو : َﺖْﻴَﺴْﻣَأ اَذِإ
َﺘْﻨَﺗ َﻼَﻓ َﻚِﺗﺎَﻴَﺣ ْﻦِﻣَو ،َﻚِﺿَﺮَﻤِﻟ َﻚِﺘﱠﺤِﺻ ْﻦِﻣ ْﺬُﺧَو ،َءﺎَﺴَﻤْﻟا ِﺮِﻈَﺘْﻨَﺗ َﻼَﻓ َﺖْﺤَﺒْﺻَأ اَذِإَو ،َحﺎَﺒﱠﺼﻟا ِﺮِﻈ
 َﻚِﺗْﻮَﻤِﻟ. 
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orang asing atau pengembara “, Ibnu Umar berkata : Jika kamu berada di sore hari jangan 
tunggu pagi hari, dan jika kamu berada di pagi hari jangan tunggu sore hari, gunakanlah 
kesehatanmu untuk (persiapan saat) sakitmu dan kehidupanmu untuk kematianmu “  
(Riwayat Bukhori) 
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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to analyze the determinants of capital buffer on 16 Biggest 
comercial banks in Indonesia. Research model based on Ayuso, et al. (2004), 
Tabak, et al. (2011), and Jokipii and Milne (2008). The model consists of 5 
independent variables that are Return on Equity (ROEt-1), Non Performing Loan 
(NPL), Increment of Capital Buffer (IncrBUFF), Loans to Total Assets (VLOAN), 
and Bank’s Share Assets (BSA) and one dependent variable which is Capital Buffer 
(BUFF).  
This study conducted for the period 2004-2010. The empirical result showed 
capital buffer is affected mainly by two variables: Non Performing Loand and 
Increment of Capital Buffer. NPL positive sign signaling that comercial banks 
adopt a conservative behavior and do not take risks. Return on Equity (ROEt-1) 
affected negaively to capital buffer, it is signaling that comercial banks in Indonesia 
may have unlimited acces to external capital and/or prefer their financing from 
equity. Loans to Total Assets (VLOAN) have negative and significant on 
influencing capital buffer, it also signaling that comercial banks in Indonesia use 
“bacward-looking” strategy by reducing their capital buffer during the boom of 
credit activities. Bank’s Share Assets (BSA) finding is supporting Too Big To Fail 
(TBTF) nature that suggest the large banks tend to maintain their capital buffer 
lower than small banks.  
Keywords : Capital Buffer, ROEt-1, NPL, Increment of Capital Buffer, Loans to 
Total Assets, bank’s Share Assets. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi 
cadangan modal (BUFF) pada 16 bank komersial terbesar di Indonesia. Penelitian 
ini berdasarkan pada penelitian sebelumnya yaitu Ayuso, dkk. (2004), Tabak, dkk. 
(2011), dan Jokipii dan Milne (2008). Model ini terdiri dari 5 variabel independen 
yaitu Return on Equity (ROEt-1), Non Performing Loan (NPL) Increment of 
Capital Buffer (IncrBUFF), Loans to Total Assets (VLOAN), Banks' Share Assets 
(BSA) dan satu variabel dependen yaitu cadangan modal(BUFF). 
Penelitian ini dilakukan untuk periode 2004-2010. Hasil empiris 
menunjukkan bahwa cadangan modal dipengaruhi terutama oleh dua variabel: 
Non Performing Loan dan Increment of capital Buffer. Pengaruh positif NPL 
menandakan bahwa bank di Indonesia mengadopsi perilaku konservatif dan 
cenderung tidak mengambil risiko. Return on Equity (ROEt-1) berpengaruh negatif 
dengan cadangan modal, hal ini menandakan bahwa bank-bank di Indonesia 
memiliki akses tak terbatas pada modal eksternal dan / atau lebih memilih 
pembiayaan dari ekuitas. VLOAN juga berpengaruh negatif dan tidak signifikan 
pada cadangan modal, hal ini menandakan bahwa bank di Indonesia 
menggunakan strategi "backward looking" dengan mengurangi cadangan modal 
selama periode booming dalam pendistribusian kredit. Penemuan terhadap Banks’ 
Share Assets setuju dengan teori “Too Big To Fail” (TBTF) yang menyatakan 
bahwa bank besar cenderung menjaga capital buffernya lebih rendah daripada 
pada bank kecil. 
Kata Kunci : Capital Buffer, ROEt-1, NPL, Increment of Capital Buffer, Loans to 
Total Assets, Bank’s Share Assets 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Research Background 
A financial service is industry that experienced the most rapid change and 
growth in many countries. Indonesia, with total population of approximately 240 
million people and an average population aged 28 years, becoming a potential 
land for market penetration of banking. Moreover, the level of market penetration 
is still low by the number of people who have bank accounts only 40 million to 50 
million peoples. In the last 20 years, the banking sector is always growing and still 
dominated by 82% of the assets of all financial sector assets, such as insurance, 
multi finance, pension funds, and securities companies (Info Bank Outlook, 
2011). 
Functions of the bank as an agent of trust is not only necessary for 
individuals and society as a whole, but also plays a role in facilitating economics  
growth and development of the country. In addition, the bank also helps to 
facilitate the transaction, production and consumption through its function as an 
agency of payment system (Rivai, Veithzal, et al., 2007). In order to be well 
functioned, banks must have sufficient capital, good asset quality, good 
management and operated on the principle of prudence, and also making a profit. 
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As a vital institution in the economy, it is necessary to control a healthy and 
stability by the banking regulator.  
Commercial banks are the most heavily regulated financial institutions in 
Indonesia. This largely reflects the critically important role bank play in the 
payment system and in providing credit to individuals and business. The large 
number of failed banks during crisis in 1998 force Bank Indonesia as a reserve 
bank in Indonesia to redesign its regulatory framework encompassing and deposit 
insurance. Fundamentally, there are five reasons for bank regulation. First, to 
ensure the safety and soundness of bank and financial instrument. Second, to 
provide an efficient and competitive financial system. Third, to provide monetary 
stability. Fourth, to maintain the integrity of the nation’s payment system. Fifth, to 
protect consumers from abuses by credit granting institutions (Rose, 2002). 
Precious lessons from the crisis of 1998 was indicated that the national 
banking industry still weak on regulation because it did not has a solid banking 
infrastructure, so it would be not easy to overcome internal and external shocks 
that come suddenly. The weakness of banking’s regulation becomes challenges 
that still must be resolved in order to encourage economic growth at the expected 
level and keep the soundness and stability (Rivai, Veithzal, et al., 2007).       
To enhance the soundness and stability of the financial system, regulators 
of banks impose the restricted regulation on the capital requirement, several 
instrument have been adopted for the regulation of banking institutions, the most 
prominent taking the form of the capital requirement regulation. As imposed by 
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the 1988 Basel Capital Accord and its subsequent amendments, the regulation 
requires that banks hold a minimum amount of capital equal to eight percent (8%) 
of risk weighted assets.  This ratio is known as the capital adequacy ratio (CAR). 
Indonesia adopted the rule was originally intended to overcome the effects 
of banking competition post financial deregulation in the 1990s. However, banks 
commercial at the time tends to break the rules minimum of capital requirement 
and respond to competitive pressures by extending credit to risky projects, where 
most of the bad debt can be found at non-tradable sectors such as real estate, 
property and construction. Although the capital reserves that continue to erode 
due to bad loans that are too large, the banks remain in operation until the end of 
the financial crisis can not be avoided (Creed, 1999). 
An update version of capital accord, Basel II, already implemented in 
Indonesia with the objective of bringing bank capital requirement more in line 
with actual risk. In early 2004, Bank Indonesia strengthens bank capital 
regulation. The regulation known as the Indonesian Banking Architecture (API). 
API requires minimum capital of Rp 3 Trillion for establish a new bank. While 
banks has been established, there are obliged to meet minimum capital of Rp 100 
Billions until the end of 2010. To strengthen the API, Bank Indonesia implement 
new consolidation rules in June 2005, which commercial banks are required to 
have capital Rp 8 billions until the end of 2007 (Infobanknews, 2006). 
Strengthening regulations on capital bank is nothing but it is the Bank Indonesia’s 
effort in preparation for BASEL II.  
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The lattes version of capital accord called BASEL III will be implemented 
in Indonesia in 2018, The World Bank explains Basel III is the latest global 
standards for the regulation of capital adequacy and liquidity. Basel III regulations 
are made to respond to the global financial crisis, which revealed various 
shortcomings in the regulation of global finance. In the financial sector, Basel III 
is not only touches on prudential regulations (relating to the precautionary 
principle) micro scale, but also on macro scale, because it can maintain the 
stability of the financial system. Basel III will introduces additional capital 
buffers, a mandatory capital conservation buffer of 2.5% and a discretionary 
countercyclical buffer, which allows national regulators to require up to another 
2.5% of capital during periods of high credit growth. The measures proposed 
Basel III also aims to reduce financial sector conditions are pro-cyclical (pro-
cyclicality) and reduce systemic risks, including by addressing the problem of 
liquidity. 
Incorporated banks in Indonesia generally maintain a capital adequacy 
ratio (CAR) well above the regulatory requirement. For example, the average 
CAR of licensed commercial banks were 18,8 per cent in the 2010, against an 
average required minimum of just 8 per cent, that means banks has 10,8 per cent 
for their capital buffer (Bank Indonesia). This phenomenon is also common in 
other economies. It raises the question of what factors determine the actual 
amount of capital held by banks can affect the level of bank capital.  
 
 
 
5 
 
The excess of Capital Adequacy Ratio so called as Capital Buffer gets a 
great deal of attention in the economic literature considering that banks serve a 
pivotal role in the economy. However, the level of minimum CAR set by the 
regulator may not fully capture banks’ risks. There could also be risks that do not 
concern the regulator, but affect banks’ capital holding decisions, including 
financial distress caused by a loss of branches value. Such as, banks’ views on the 
appropriate level of capital may differ from the minimum level set by the 
regulator. 
Table 1.1  
Capital Buffer Ratios Banking in Indonesia (%) 
Ratios CAR Minimum  CAR Capital Buffer 
2004 19,42 8 11,42 
2005 19,3 8 11,3 
2006 21,27 8 13,27 
2007 19,3 8 11,3 
2008 16,76 8 8,76 
2009 17,42 8 9,42 
2010 18,80 8 10,80 
      Source: Bank Indonesia (compiled) 
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Figure 1.1 
 Level of Capital Buffer Ratio Banking in Indonesia (%) 
 
 
 
 
 Source: Bank Indonesia (compiled) 
Function of capital buffer in the banking industry is strickly needed to 
anticipate an increase of future losses and to anticipate when capital is rare and 
expensive in downturn period. Mishkin (2007) argued that banks also hold excess 
capital or capital buffer are made based on three most common reasons. First, 
bank capital aids to prevent bank failure. A bank maintains it’s capital to reduce 
the chance of become insolvent. Banks will prefer to have a sufficient capital to 
act as cushion to absorb the losses. Second, the amount of capital affects returns 
for the equity holders of the bank. The higher the bank capital, the lower the 
return that the owners of the banks. There is a trade off  between the safety and 
the returns to equity holders, so the bank managers had to set an optimal  level of 
bank capital. Third, a minimum amount of bank capital is required by the 
regulators.  
In chart above shown that commercial banks in Indonesia always generally 
maintains a capital adequacy ratio (CAR) well above the regulatory requirement 
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(more than 8%). The highest level of capital buffer happened in 2006, this 
discussion become more interesting because the lowest level of Capital buffer 
occured in 2008, but afterward, level of Capital Buffer was always increase.  The 
average CAR from 2004-2010 touched 18,89% against BASEL III only required 
13% of minimum CAR. Too much CAR value is not good for banking industry, 
since it’s excess capital can be used for runing the business of banking and 
maximizing of it’s profit. 
 
Table 1.2  
Financial Ratios (BUFF, CAR, and NPL)  
Comercial banks in Indonesia 2004-2010 (%) 
Ratios 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
BUFF 11,42 11,30 13,27 11,30 8,76 10,42 10,80 
CAR 19,42 19,3 21,27 19,3 16,76 17,42 18,80 
NPL 4,50 14,75 10,70 6,50 3,74 3,46 2,80 
Source: Bureau of Bank Indonesia (compiled) 
From chart above, the  ratio of  capital buffer called BUFF showed a 
fluctuation from 2004 to 2010. Ratio of  BUFF in 2004 amounted 11,42% and in 
2005 was 11,30%, in the other hand, BUFF ratio decreased during year 2004 to 
2005. In 2006 to 2007, BUFF also decreased from 13,27%  to 11,30%. But BUFF 
ratio increased during  2008 until 2010. In 2008 was 8,76%, in 2009 was 
amounted to 10,42 and in 2010 was 10,80%. It is interesting to note that the buffer 
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capital showed increasing level during 2008 to 2010, because in those years global 
recession occured. 
In term of NPL data, there are some data gap that is not relevant with 
theory, it was happened during year 2005 to 2010 except year of 2007. When Non 
performing loan (NPL) has showed the decline, but BUFF showed the uptrend. 
Furfine (2000) and Estrella (2004) found a significant positive coefficient would 
indicate that higher risk leads to higher capital buffers. The theory predicts this 
coefficient should be positive since higher risks increase the probability of 
meeting regulatory capital constraints and facing the related costs such as market 
discipline and supervisory intervention. Non-Performing Loans (NPL) from year 
to year has always experienced a trend decline during 2005-2010, beginning in 
2005 was 14,75%  to 10,7% in 2006, in the year 2007 NPL amounting to 6,5%, in 
2008 decreased to 3,74%, during 2009 to 2010 NPL was decreasing too from 
3,46%, to 2,8%. This indicates that the ratio of non performing loans getting less 
and be able to overcome. 
 
The purpose of this research is to assess the determinants of bank capital 
buffer’s comercial bank in Indonesia. The methodology is roughly similar to the 
one used by a literature on the determinants of capital buffers. This allows for a 
direct comparison of the results with theirs, especially those of Ayuso et al. (2004) 
based on Spanish banks. Other empirical studies include Jokipii and Milne (2006) 
for the Finland, Lindquist (2003) for Norway, Kleff and Weber (2005) for 
Germany, Prasetyantoko and Soedarmono (2010) for Indonesia, and the lates 
research was conducting by Benjamin M. Tabak et all (2011) in Brazil. 
 
9 
 
Basically there are three different types of costs associated to bank capital 
to the model capital buffers, based on Ayuso et al. (2004), Lindquist (2004), Stolz 
and Wedow, (2009), Brown and Davis (2008), Fonseca and Gonzalez (2009), Nier 
and Baumman (2006), Jokipii and Milne (2008), and Tabak et al. (2011), wich 
there are including cost of holding capital, cost of financial bankcruptcy or 
financial distress, and adjustment costs. 
Some researchees on the determinants of capital buffers have been 
conducted, including Ayuso et al. (2002), Jokipii and Milne (2008), and 
Prasetyantoko & Soedarmono (2008) uses ROE as a proxy of capital holding cost,  
the result was showing a negative influence between ROE and Capital Buffer. De 
Bont and Prast (1999) find That ROE is only negative in countries with large 
stock markets, suggesting that the argument of "opportunity cost of capital" hold 
only in countries were shareholder value is Important and access to external 
finance relatively cheap. It is contrary to the findings of Nier (2006), D'Avack & 
Levasseur (2007) found a positive correlation between ROE and capital buffer, it 
indicates that there is a role of shareholders in disciplining market. Shareholders 
tend to increase the capital buffer to keep the market value (Park and Peristiani, 
2007). 
The bank's risk profile or cost bankcruptcy also determines capital buffer, 
since it is related to the likelihood of costs of failure. Jokipii and Milne (2008), 
Fonseca and Gonzalez (2009) use the non-performing loan ratio to total loans 
(NPL) to proxy the banks risk and the result has found a positive correlation 
between NPL and capital buffers. While Alfon et al. (2005) found a negative 
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correlation Between NPL and capital buffer, a negative coefficient would however 
indicate "moral hazard" behavior, where banks assume higher risks with lower 
buffers, it could also indicate more sophisticated risk management systems, 
allowing banks to hold lower buffers for the same amount of risk (Alfon et al., 
2005). 
Capital adjustment also has important effect on determining capital 
buffers, since banks may face adjustment costs in moving toward optimal their 
capital ratios. Ayuso et al. (2002) and Esterella (2004) using lag of capital buffer 
(BUFFt-1) to proxy this cost, the result was showing positive significant on 
influencing capital buffer. But this research  try to change lag of capital buffer 
variable into increment of capital buffer variable, since this capital buffer 
decission not only determined by adjusting capital buffer at the previous period (t-
1), but also determined by capital buffer at the current period (t). So we expect the 
delta of capital buffer will affect positevely, as same as lag of capital buffer. 
In this research also add some other determinats to find a real determinants 
that can effect to capital buffer's comercial banks in Indonesia, there are two other 
determinats that also included in this research such as Bank's Loans To Total 
Assets and Bank’s Share Assets. Loans To Total Assets is considered in the 
analysis, it is expected to positively related to capital buffer because the higher 
amount of distributed loans, the more risky a bank may be to higher defaults. 
Bank's Share Assets also considered as independent variables, therefore in this 
study need to asses strategy to decrease capital buffer that could be used for 
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banking with high share assets. It also will prove Too Big To Fail consensus that 
states large banks tend to decrease their capital buffer. 
It is important to highlight that most of the comercial banks in Indonesia 
hold capital above the required minimum ratio. But unfortunately, study on capital 
buffer in Indonesia is still difficult to found. The discussion about capital buffer 
banks have not been touched yet in academic and policy level. This study wanted 
to analyze more about the determinants of capital buffer comercial banks in 
Indonesia, since that bank’s CAR in Indonesia has reached a level of average 
18,89% during the period 2004-2010, when the minimum capital regulations only 
required banks to have CAR equal to 8% and a new BASEL III only required 
CAR to 13%. 
Thus, based on research gap and theory gap as explained above, there is a 
need to asess “The Determinants of Capital Buffers’ Comercial Banks in 
Indonesia” (Study on 16 Biggest Comercial Banks in Indonesia). Built upon 
those reasons, this research tries to analyze what is determinants of capital buffer 
in Indonesia which is influenced by some variables such as Return on Equity, Non 
Performing Loan, Increment of Capital Buffer, Loans To Total Assets, and Bank 
Share Assets.  
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1.2 Problem Statement and Research Questions 
The research question will be built based on research gap. We can see 
from previous research as mentioned above in research background that show the 
gap between one researcher to other researchers. Such the other previous research 
conducted by Jokipii and Milne (2008) analyze the cyclical behaviour of 
European bank capital buffer’s bank of Finland. The research uses ROE as one of 
determinants of capital buffer and the result for this variable is negative. As noted 
by Jokipii and Milne (2008), ROE may well exceed the remuneration demanded 
by shareholders and to this extent is a measure of revenue rather than cost. A high 
level of earnings substitutes for capital as a buffer against unexpected shocks. 
Thus, as raising capital through the capital markets is costly, retained earnings are 
frequently used to increase capital buffers. So the expected sign for ROE may be 
negative (Jokipii and Milne, 2008; Stolz and Wedow, 2005), but it also may be 
positive (Nier and Baumman, 2006). 
The other research gap also found in Fonseca and Gonzalez (2009) 
research. They use the non-performing loan ratio to total loans (NPL) to proxy the 
bank risk, the results found a positive relationship between capital buffers and risk 
that proxy by non performing loan. But Alfon et al. (2005) and Miguel Boucinha 
(2008) found a negative correlation Between NPL and capital buffer.  
Increment of Capital Buffer (∆BUFF) variable also will be analyzed 
although Ayuso et al. (2002) and Esterella (2004) using lag of capital buffer 
variable to proxy cost of capital adjustment, the results was showing a positive 
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and significant on influencing capital buffer. Study on incremental capital buffer 
try to add some other finding research on determining capital buffer, especially it 
still haven’t touch yet in Indonesia, so the author will include this variable also in 
this research. 
The other variable also has important on determining capital buffer since 
Prasetyantoko and Soedarmono (2008) also analyze Bank's Share Assets (BSA) 
and Loans to Total Assets (VLOAN) on influencing capital buffer comercial 
banks in Indonesia. But the research only conducted in 4 years during the period 
of 2004 – 2007, so to prove the real of those two varibales in influencing capital 
buffer, this research will analyze those variables with longer period time during 
2004-2010. 
Built upon those problem, research questions which will be studied in this 
research are listed as follows: 
1. Does Return on Equity (ROE t-1) influence Capital buffer banking in 
indonesia during 2004-2010? 
2. Does Non Performing Loans (NPL) influence Capital Buffer banking in 
Indonesia during 2004-2010? 
3. Does Increment of Capital Buffer (∆BUFF) influence Capital Buffer 
banking in Indonesia during 2004-2010? 
4. Does Loans to Total Assets (VLOAN) influence Capital Buffer banking in 
indonesia during 2004-2010? 
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5. Does Bank’s Share Assets (BSA) influence Capital Buffer banking in 
Indonesia during 2004-2010? 
 
1.3 Objective and Research Benefit 
1.3.1 Research Objective: 
The objectives of this study are: 
1. To analyze the influence of Equity (ROE t-1)  on Capital buffer banking in 
indonesia from 2004-2010. 
2. To analyze the influence of Non Performing Loans (NPL) on Capital 
Buffer banking in Indonesia from 2004-2010. 
3. To analyze the influence of  Increment of Capital Buffer (∆BUFF) on 
Capital Buffer banking in indonesia from 2004-2010. 
4. To analyze the influence of Loans to Total Assets (VLOAN) on Capital 
Buffer banking in indonesia from 2004-2010. 
5. To analyze the influence of  Bank’s Share Assets (BSA) on Capital Buffer 
banking in Indonesia from 2004-2010. 
 
1.3.2. Research Benefits 
The benefits this research are: 
1. Benefit for Civitas Academica 
The results of this study are expected to contribute knowledge 
about the determinants of capital buffer’s comercial banks in Indonesia. 
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Result of this research also hopefully can add empirical research repository 
about science discipline of finance management management, especially 
concerning about capital buffer. 
2. Benefit for Bankers 
This research is expected to be able to analyze the future financial 
condition, so it could be a reference materials for banking industry to 
strategize about the future of banking regarding BASEL III will be 
implemented in 2018. 
3. Benefit for Readers 
For all readers, this study is expected to increase the knowledge 
and information who want to study about the problem of capital buffers 
comercial banking in Indonesia. As well as reference material to make a 
comparative study in the future regarding study on capital buffer still rare 
to find in Indonesia. 
 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
Outline of the bachelor thesis is describe as follows: 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Chapter I provide the research backround about determinants of capital 
buffer, problem discussion, research questions, research purpose, and research 
benefits.  
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CHAPTER II: LITERATUR REVIEW 
Chapter II contains underlying theories and reviews of the previous study 
that has a closer relationship to the subject of this study. It also contains theoritical 
framework of the study and hypothesis. 
CHAPTER III: RESEARCH METODOLOGY 
Chapter III explains the research method. This chapter also includes a 
definision and operational measurement of the variables, population and sampling 
frame, data type and data source. This chapter also describe analysis method used 
in the research. 
CHAPTER IV: RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
Chapter IV presents research object, data analysis, and discussion of the 
research hypothesis. 
CHAPTER V: CONCLUSIONS 
Chapter V provide the conclusions and implication drawn from the 
research. I includes the limitation of the study and suggestions. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Theoretical Backround 
2.1.1 Bank’s Capital  
 The capital accounts of a comercial bank play several vital role in 
supporting its daily operations and ensuring its long run viability. Rose (2002) 
propose there are five functions of bank capital, first, capital provides a cushion 
against the risk of failure by absorbing financial and operating losses until 
management can address the bank’s problem and restore the institution’s 
profitability. Second, capital provides the funds needed to get the bank chartered, 
organized, and operating before deposits come flowing in. Third, capital promotes 
public confidence in bank and reassures its creditor of the bank’s financial 
srength, capital also must be strong enough reassure borrowers thet bank will be 
able to meet their credit needs even if the economy turns down. Fourth, capital 
provides fund for organization’s growth and the development of new services, 
program, and facilities. Fifth, capital serves a regulator of bank’s growth, helping 
to ensure that individual bank’s growth is held to a pace that is suistainable in the 
long run. 
Both of the regulatory authorities and the financial markets require that bank 
capital increases roughly in line with the growth of loans and other risky bank 
assets. Thus, the cushion to absorb losses is supposed to increase along with a 
banking institution’s growing risk expossure. A bank that expands its loans and 
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deposits too fast will start receiving signals from the market and regulatory 
community that its growth must be slowed or additional capital must be required. 
So, capital regulation by the bank regulatory agencies has become an 
increasingly important tool to limit how much risk exposure banks can accept. In 
this role capital not only tends to promote public confidence in banks and the 
banking system but also serves to protect the government’s deposit insurance 
system from serious losses. 
  
2.1.2 Bank Regulation  
Bank regulations are a form of government regulation which subject banks 
to certain requirements, restrictions and guidelines. This regulatory structure 
creates transparency between banking institutions and the individuals and 
corporations with whom they conduct business, among other things. Given the 
interconnectedness of the banking industry and the reliance that the national and 
global economy hold on banks, it is important for regulatory agencies to maintain 
control over the standardized practices of these institutions. 
Rose (2002) propose the principal reasons banks are subject to bank’s 
regulation. First, to protect the safety of the public’s saving, it is related to 
minimum requirements, requirements are imposed on banks in order to promote 
the objectives of the regulator. Often, these requirements are closely tied to the 
level of risk exposure for a certain sector of the bank. The most important 
minimum requirement in banking regulation is maintaining minimum capital 
ratios. Second, to control the supply of money and credit in order to achieve a 
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nation’s broad economic goals, such as high economic’s growth, low inflation, 
and high employment. Third, to ensure equal opportunity and fairness in the 
public’s access to credit and other vital financial services. Fourth, to promote 
public confidence in the financial system, so that savings flow smootly into 
productive investment, and payments for goods and services are made speedily 
and efficiently. Fifth, to avoid concentrations of financial power in the hands of a 
few individuals and institutions. Sixth, to provide the government with credit, tax 
revenues, and other services. Seventh, to helps sectors of the economy that have 
special credit needs, such as housing, small business, and agriculture.  
The capital regulation by the bank regulatory agencies has become one of 
the key instruments of modern banking regulation with aim to provide both a 
capital buffer during adverse economic conditions, as well as a mechanism aimed 
at preventing excessive risk ex ante (Rochet, 1992). And this regulations becomes 
an increasingly important tool to the safety of the public’s saving, to the public’s 
confidence in the financial system and to the limit on how much risk exposure 
banks can accept. In this role capital also serves protect the government’s deposit 
insurance system from serious losses. 
The capital regulation by the bank regulatory called as capital requirement 
sets a framework on how banks must handle their capital in relation to their assets. 
Globally, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision influences each country's 
capital requirements. In 1988, the Committee decided to introduce a capital 
measurement system commonly referred to as the Basel Capital Accords. The 
latest capital adequacy framework is commonly known as Basel III, This updated 
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framework is intended to be more risk sensitive than the original one, but is also a 
lot more complex. The capital regulation rules those recomended by the BASEL 
Accord are minimum to be implemented by banks globally in across country with 
the aim to ensure a sound and stable financial environment. 
 
2.1.3. The BASEL Agreement on International Capital Standards  
2.1.2.1 BASEL I 
In 1987 the Federal Reserve Board, representing by 12 countries such as 
United States, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Luxemborg) announced 
preliminary agreement on new capital standard, often referred to as the Basel 
Agreement or Basel I that would be uniformly applied to all banking institutions 
in their respective juridictions. Formally approved in July 1988, those new 
requirements are designed to encourage leading banks to strengthen their capital 
positions, reduce inequality in the regulatory rules of different nations, and 
consider the risk to bank of the off balance sheet commitments that they have 
made in recent years. 
Basel I, primarily focused on credit risk. Assets of banks were classified 
and grouped in five categories according to credit risk, carrying risk weights of 
zero (for example home country sovereign debt), ten, twenty, fifty, and up to one 
hundred percent (this category has, as an example, most corporate debt). Banks 
with international presence are required to hold capital equal to 8 % of the risk-
weighted assets. This version has helped to strengthen the soundness and stability 
 
 
21 
   
of international banking system as a result of the higher capital ratios that it 
required. 
 
2.1.2.3 BASEL II 
Basel II initially published on June 2004, aims to create an international 
standard for banking regulators to bring the framework more in line with modern 
banking by becoming more risk sensitive and representative of current risk 
management practise. This version intended to control how much capital banks 
need to put aside to guard against the types of financial and operational risks 
banks (and the whole economy) face.  
Basel II was created to build on a solid foundation of prudent capital 
regulation, supervision, and market discipline, and to enhance further risk 
management and financial stability. As such, the Committee encourages each 
national supervisor to consider carefully the benefits of the new framework in the 
context of its own domestic banking system and in developing a timetable and 
approach to implementation. Given resource and other constraints, these plans 
may extend beyond the Committee's implementation dates. That said, supervisors 
should consider implementing key elements of the supervisory review and market 
discipline components of the new framework even if the Basel II minimum capital 
requirements are not fully implemented by the implementation date. National 
supervisors should also ensure that banks that implement Basel II are subject to 
prudent capital regulation and sound accounting and provisioning policies. 
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Advocates of Basel II believed that such an international standard could 
help protect the international financial system from the types of problems that 
might arise should a major bank or a series of banks collapse. In theory, Basel II 
attempted to accomplish this by setting up risk and capital management 
requirements designed to ensure that a bank has adequate capital for the risk the 
bank exposes itself to through its lending and investment practices (BIS, 2012). 
Generally speaking, these rules mean that the greater risk to which the bank is 
exposed, the greater the amount of capital the bank needs to hold to safeguard its 
solvency and overall economic stability. 
 
2.1.2.3. BASEL III 
Forum Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in Switzerland has 
decided that the world have to improve standards of banking regulation following 
the crisis 2008. With the due date of January 1, 2013, the whole world should 
implement certain standards for sound banking. Bank Indonesia will adapt some 
of the rules related to it, Indonesia compared to other countries, it has actually 
been quite strong. That's since the capital structure of banks in Indonesia is still 
strong with an average capital adequacy ratio (CAR) 17% (Gayatri, 2012).  
Basel III is intended to be applied consistently around the world so as to 
reduce the risk that financial institutions will move their operations to jurisdictions 
with more lenient regulatory regimes. However, it is by no means clear that Basel 
III will be implemented uniformly around the world. The timing of 
implementation will not be identical, and banks with operations in multiple 
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countries may be compelled to comply with the tightest national timeline to which 
they are subject. Even when fully implemented, the finer details of national capital 
adequacy regimes are likely to differ and, again, international banks may find 
themselves compelled to comply with the rules of the host country with the most 
stringent national capital adequacy requirements. 
Basel III’s new requirement for countercyclical capital buffers may also be 
difficult for banks with international operations. Basel III requires that individual 
countries consider whether to increase their national capital requirements when 
there is an unsafe build-up of credit. If a bank has operations in more than one 
country, the countercyclical buffer that it is required to maintain will be a 
weighted average of all of the countercyclical buffers in force in countries in 
which it has credit exposure. 
Generally speaking, Indonesia is ready for implementing BASEL III 
because banks in Indonesia has more components of tier one, however, the 
tightening of the Basel capital rules will still affect Indonesia. Capitalization rules 
will be tightened. The final rule requires the Basel minimum capital of 13% CAR 
by the composition of at least 6% tier one, 2% tier two, capital conservation buffer 
of 2.5% , and  another 2.5% of capital during periods of high credit growth.  
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2.1.4  Theories Related to Capital Buffer 
The theories related to capital buffer study that author have decided for 
this research are as follows: Pecking Order Theory and To Big Too Fail 
Consensus. Research on capital buffer has close conection to capital structure, so 
the underlying theories used are based on capital structure theory too and capital 
buffer is one of bank's behavior in their capital structure. 
 
2.1.4.1 The Pecking Order Theory 
In the theory of firm's capital structure and financing decisions, the 
pecking order theory was first suggested by Donaldson  in (1961) and it was 
modified by Stewart C. Myers and Nicolas Majluf in (1984). It states that 
companies prioritize their sources of financing (from internal financing to equity) 
according to the principle of least effort, preferring to raise equity as a financing 
means of last resort. Hence, internal funds are used first, and when that is 
depleted, debt is issued, and when it is not sensible to issue any more debt, equity 
is issued.  
Pecking order theory starts with asymmetric information as managers 
know more about their companies prospects, risks and value than outside 
investors. Asymmetric information affects the choice between internal and 
external financing and between the issue of debt or equity. Stewart C. Myers and 
Nicolas Majluf in (1984) stated that equity is more costly compare to other bank 
liabilities because of information asymmetries. Equity may also be disadvantaged 
because interest payments on debt are deducted from earnings before tax. Excess 
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capital is hence expected to be negatively associated with equity cost. Therefore, 
previous studies have considered the return on equity (ROE) as a proxy variable 
for the direct cost of remunerating excess capital. Thus, this research expect a 
negative relationship between ROE and excess capital (capital buffer). 
Banks may face adjustment costs in moving toward their optimal capital 
ratios. These costs arise both when the bank is raising new external capital and 
when it is shedding external capital (Estrella, 2004). Equity also is a form of 
capital for which monitoring costs are high, and the bank has an informational 
advantage over public investors as to the value of its own equity, which would 
increase the cost of the desired adjustment (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Accordingly, the issuance of equity could be seen by the potential buyers as a 
negative signal with regard to the banks’ value. An important cost of shedding 
equity comes from pressure from regulators, supervisors and market participants 
to maintain clearly sound levels of capital (Estrella, 2004).  
An excess, or a deficiency of capital can arise as a result of the difficulties 
in capital adjustment. However, the consequence of falling short of capital is 
probably more serious, so banks are more likely to be “over-capitalised” than 
“under-capitalised”. In addition to the assumption of asymmetric information, 
changing capital level can be give a bad signal, thus making the bank reluctant to 
react quickly when capital shocks occur (Myers and Majluf, 1984). 
Ayuso et al. (2002) and Estrella (2004) found Lag of Capial Buffer 
(BUFFt-1) coefficient may be interpreted as a measure of adjustment costs in 
capital buffers and its sign is positive. This research not using lag of capital buffer 
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as a proxy of capital adjustment, but it will use increment of capital buffer, this 
variable expected its sign to be positive as same as lag of capital buffer. 
 
2.1.4.2 Too Big To Fail Consensus 
 A clear predictions about capital buffer obviously is related to the size of 
the bank. a consensus has been reached, where large banks tend to have lower 
capital buffer than small banks, due to the nature of the Too Big To Fail (Kane 
2000; Mishkin 2006). In addition to Too Big To Fail, large bank is easily to get 
their financing from capital market and it has a comparative advantage to address 
the problem information to improve monitoring efforts to encourage them to strike 
a balance between cost supervision and the cost of equity. In turn, banks will 
reduce the cost of equity by way of lower capital reserves. 
 
2.1.5 Capital Buffer 
Bank’s capital buffer (BUFF) is defined as the difference between the 
CAR ratio (ratio the adequacy of bank capital) to the regulatory capital minimum 
of 8%. Despite the safety and soundness benefits of capital regulation, requiring 
banks to hold increased levels of capital that does have costs and can be argued to 
be a binding constraint on bank behaviour.  
Bank’s capital buffers can view as a cushion, to absorb unexpected shock, 
if the financial distress costs from low capital and the costs of accessing new 
capital are high (Wong,et al. 2005). In addition, low capitalization banks are also 
easy to lose market confidence and reputation. Therefore, Furfine (2001) mentions 
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that banks may hold capital buffers as insurance to avoid cost about market 
discipline and supervisory intervention if they approach or fall below the 
regulatory minimum capital ratio. 
Other reasons to have capital buffers, Berger et al. (1995) considers that 
market forces lead banks to keep capital buffers, even when capital is relatively 
costly, as bank capital commits the bank to monitor and without deposit insurance 
that allows the bank to raise deposits more cheaply. Jokipii and Milne (2008) 
argue that in the event of a substantial increase in loan demand, banks with 
relatively little capital may lose market share to those that are well capitalized. 
Mishkin (2006) argued that banks also hold capital are made based on 
three most common reasons. First, bank capital aids to prevent bank failure. A 
bank maintains bank capital to reduce the chance of become insolvent. Banks will 
prefer to have a sufficient capital to act as cushion to absorb the losses. Second, 
the amount of capital affects returns for the equity holders of the bank. The higher 
the bank capital, the lower the return that the owners of the banks. There is a trade 
off  between the safety and the returns to equity holders, so the bank managers 
had to set an optimal  level of bank capital. Third, a minimum amount of bank 
capital is required by the regulators. 
Basically there are three different types of costs associated to bank capital 
to the model of capital buffers, based on Ayuso et al. (2004), Lindquist (2004), 
Stolz and Wedow, (2009), Brown and Davis (2008), Fonseca and Gonzalez 
(2009), Nier and Baumman (2006), Jokipii and Milne (2008), and Tabak et al. 
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(2011), including of holding capital, cost of financial bankcruptcy or financial 
distress, and adjustment costs. 
Ayuso et al. (2002), Jokipii and Milne (2008), and Prasetyantoko & 
Soedarmono (2010) uses ROE as a proxy of capital holding cost, the result was 
proving Return on Equity (ROE) has a negative on influencing capital buffer. It 
was different to the findings of Bauman Nier (2006), D'Avack & Levasseur 
(2007) that found a positive correlation between ROE and capital buffer, it 
indicates there is a role of shareholders in disciplining market. Shareholders 
growing niche to increase of of the capital buffer to keep the market value (Park 
and Peristiani, 2007), this is in line with the forward looking theory by the Palia 
and Porter (2004), in which capital ratios used by banks to maintain their market 
power. 
Cost of bankcruptcy also determines capital buffers, Jokipii and Milne 
(2008), Fonseca and Gonzalez (2009) used non-performing loan ratio to total 
loans (NPL) to proxy the banks risk and the result has found a positive correlation 
between NPL and capital buffers. While Alfon et al. (2005) found a negative 
correlation Between NPL and capital buffers. This is in line with the argument by 
Mishkin (2007) which states that the banks will prefer to have a sufficient capital 
to act as a cushion to absorb the losses. 
Capital adjustment has important effect on determining capital buffers, 
since banks may face adjustment costs in moving toward optimal their capital 
ratios. Ayuso et al. (2002) using lag of capital buffers to proxy this cost, the result 
was showing a significant positive on influencing capital buffer. As mentioned in 
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the theory, this research will use increment of capital buffer to proxy capital 
adjustment.  
There are two types of behavior of banks in managing their capital. First, 
banks that are backward-looking will reduce the capital buffer during the boom to 
extend credit activities. As a result, they fail to think of capital buffers in the 
closing credit risk, and thus, they are forced to increase capital reserves during 
periods of recession (Borio et al., 2001). Second, banks that are forward-looking 
would anticipate economic recession in the future by improving capital buffer 
during periods of economic boom. 
Ayuso et al (2004) provide an empirical evidence on the behavior of banks 
in Spain that are backward-looking to show that bank capital is procyclical. 
Jokipii and Milne (2008) found similar results in which the capital reserves in 
European banks are  procyclical during the period 1997 to 2004. 
In contrast, several studies have shown that the ratio of capital may be 
countercyclical. This is because the banks that are  forward-looking would 
anticipate economic recession using the period of economic boom not only to 
increase their profits, but also to increase the capital reserves avoiding greater 
losses in the event of an economic recession (Borio et al, 2001). Berger and Udell 
(2004) argues that the ratio of capital being countercyclical, due to develop bank 
balance sheets during a period of economic boom. Finally, in this research also 
add some other determinants to find a real determinants that can effect to capital 
buffer's comercial  banks in Indonesia, there are two other determinats that also 
included in this research such as the Loans to Total Assets (VLOAN) and Bank's Share 
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Assets (BSA). VLOAN is considered in the analysis, it uses to determine wheather the 
higher loan’s growth will effects in reducing capacity to raise bank’s capital reserve or 
not. BSA also considered as independent variables, therefore in this study need to prove 
whether the bank with a substantial market power is relatively easier to get a profit so as 
to encourage banks to increase of capital reserves from the profit. 
 
2.1.6 The Determinants of Capital Buffer 
As mentioned above, this research following Ayuso et al. (2004), Jokipii 
and Milne (2008), and Tabak  (2011), there are three different types of bank 
capital-related costs to model capital buffers: cost of holding capital, cost of 
financial distress, and adjustment costs. 
 
2.1.6.1 Cost of Holding Capital 
Holding capital implies direct costs of remunerating the excess of capital, 
that is the opportunity cost of the capital (Ayuso, et al., 2002). Therefore, banks’ 
incentives to hold capital buffers depend on the cost of capital compared to the 
cost of deposits (Fonseca and Gonzalez, 2009). Theoritical analysis (see Myers 
and Majluf, 1984; Campbell, 1979) has argued that in the context of information 
asymetries, equity is a more costly alternative to other bank liabilities. In this 
research, include the banks return on equity (ROE) in order to capture direct costs 
of remunerating excess capital. this measures reveals how much profit company 
earned in comparison to the total amount of shareholder equity found on the 
balance sheet.  
 
 
 
31 
   
2.1.6.1.1 Return on Equity (ROEt-1) 
When the return on equity is high, it is costly to hold excess capital. In this 
case, a profit-maximising bank may maintain a lower capital buffer when the 
opportunity cost of capital is high. Several previous researches, Ayuso et al.(2002) 
and Jokipii & Milne (2008) found  negative correlation between Capital Buffer 
and the return on equity, it was suggested that banks would reduce capital holding 
when the cost of capital is high. 
Ayuso et al. (2004), Jokipii and Milne (2008) use each institutions’ return 
on equity (ROE) to proxy cost of holding capital. As noted by Jokipii and Milne 
(2008), ROE may well exceed the remuneration demanded by shareholders and to 
this extent is a measure of revenue rather than cost. A high level of earnings 
substitutes for capital as a buffer against unexpected shocks. Thus, as raising 
capital through the capital markets is costly, retained earnings are frequently used 
to increase capital buffers. 
 
2.1.6.2. Cost of Financial Distress 
Holding higher level of capital can ensuring banks to reduces the 
probability of bankruptcy and therefore so called the costs of failure, which 
include the loss of charter value, reputational loss and legal costs of the 
bankruptcy process (Tabak, 2011). As mentioned by Milne and Whalley (2001),  
higher levels of capital therefore reduce the risk of non-compliance and the 
subsequent costs of failure which are directly proportional to absolute value of the 
negative net worth of the failing bank.  
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Related to these costs are those associated with the existence of 
compulsory capital requirements. Higher capital levels also reduce the probability 
of not complying with those requirements, thus minimising the consequent costs. 
As a matter of fact, before regulatory limits are reached, supervisory authorities 
usually place some restrictions on the activity of the bank. The risk profile of the 
bank determines it’s capital buffer. 
Since a bank's probability of failure is reliant on its risk profile, proxy for 
the cost of failure adopting from various measures of risk. As Ayuso et al. (2004) 
measured, in this research consider the ratio of non-performing loans. If banks set 
their capital corresponding to the true riskiness of their assets portfolios, then 
would expect the relationship between capital buffers and the ratio of non-
performing loans to be positive. 
 
2.1.6.2.1 Non Performing Loans (NPL) 
Based on Ayuso et al. (2004), Jokipii and Milne (2008), Fonseca and 
Gonzalez (2009), they use the non-performing loan ratio to total loans (NPL) to 
proxy the bank risk.  Bank's risk is one of the bank's business risks, those 
happened because of failed or no payback of loans by borrowers to the banks. 
Therefore, the ability of credit management is really needed by the bank for 
managing their credit problem (Sinungan, 2000). In this research use non-
performing loans (NPL) to proxy these risks (credit risk), this ratio indicates the 
ability of bank management in managing problem loans. 
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According to regulation of Bank Indonesia (BI No. 3/30DPNP on 
december,14 2001), Non Performing Loan (NPL) measured from the 
nonperforming loan divided to total loans. The higher Non performing Loan level 
would increase costs, so it causes the potential bank to get losses.  In accordance 
with the regulations stipulated by Bank Indonesia, a good amount of Non 
Performing Loans (NPL) is below 5%. 
 
2.1.6.3 Adjustment Costs 
Banks may face adjustment costs in moving toward their optimal capital 
ratios. An excess, or a deficiency, of capital can arise as a result of the difficulties 
in capital adjustment. However, the consequence of falling short of capital is 
probably more serious, so banks are more likely to be “over-capitalised” than 
“under-capitalised”. In other words, a part of the observed capital buffer may be 
held for precautionary purposes, due partly to frictions in adjusting capital 
level.(Wong, et al., 2005). 
 
2.1.6.3.1 Increment of Capital Buffer (ΔBUFF) 
Increment of Capital Buffer (∆BUFF) is proxy of adjustment cost, it 
represents the delta of excess capital over regulatory requirements in the period t 
(now) minus excess capital over regulatory requirement in the period t-1 (one year 
before). In order to illustrate the cost of capital adjustment, this study added from 
Ayuso et al. (2004) and Estrella (2004) model that used lag of capital buffer to 
proxy adjustment cost. 
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2.1.7 The Other Determinants of Capital Buffer 
2.1.7.1 Loans to Total Assets (VLOAN) 
Distributing loans to the borrowers is the main business of banks and the 
main source of income for banks but it is contains the greatest risk as well. Loans 
to Total Assets will impact on bank earnings growth. VLOAN sustained by 
increasing of consumption today. In accordance with theory, the increased of 
consumption will also increase the loans. 
Total Loans to Total Assets ratio (VLOAN) is considered in the analysis 
because it is important ratio for banks. VLOAN expected to relate positively to 
capital buffer because the higher capital that is distributed to its credits, the riskier 
bank will face because of high credit distribution. 
 
2.1.7.2 Bank’s Share Assets 
Bank's Share Assets (BSA) also considered as independent variables. 
Prasetyantoko and Soedarmono (2008) defined bank's share assets defined as the 
ratio of total bank assets of the total banking system assets.  
 
 
 
 
2.2 Previous Researchees 
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Researches on Determinanats of Capital Buffer  have been done by some 
of the researchers, are as follows: 
1. Prasetyantoko and Soedarmono (2010) 
  These research examine whether capital buffer banking in 
Indonesia can be affected by the factors such as financial ratios, 
business cycles, regulatory, and institutional. The data used in this 
study is a monthly balance sheet and financial statements of the 99 
commercial banks in Indonesia during the period 2004 - 2007.  
From the analysis based on the bank by asset size, indicated that 
for small banks, capital buffer was positively related to the cost of 
equity, non-interest income, control of corruption, and government 
intervention. While the capital buffer will go down if the size of 
assets, ex-post credit risk, financing from the financial markets, credit 
growth, economic growth, and the rule of law increases. 
For large banks, capital buffer will be increased if the ex-post 
credit risk, the cost of equity, retained earnings, market forces, 
economic growth and control of corruption were improved. 
Meanwhile, the only financing from financial markets and government 
interventions that can reduce the capital reserves of banks. 
In addition to focus on these factors, this study shows that 
capital reserves in the banking Indonesia are procyclical. Those results 
would be different if the analysis was done by groups of banks 
according to size and the involvement of market discipline (market 
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discipline). In a large bank and the listed banks, the banks' capital 
buffer capital is countercyclical. In other words, these banks tend to 
raise the reserve optimistic in the current capital (economic booms), 
and down in a recession.  
Thus, the policy consolidation of small banks and the 
strengthening of market discipline (market discipline) is required to 
support implementation of Basel II, particularly in addressing the 
procyclical effects of minimum regulatory capital. 
2. Juan Ayuso et all (2002) 
This research analyse the relationship between the Spanish 
business cycle and the capital buffers held by Spanish commercial and 
savings banks from 1986 to 2000 using panel data.Variables in this 
research are lag of capital buffer (BUFt-1), Return On Equity (ROE), 
Non Performing Loan (NPL), BIG, SMA, and GDP growth as 
dependent variables, BIG and SMA are included to detect the 
differences in the capital buffer according to the size of each 
institution. In particular, BIG (SMA) is a dummy variable that taking 
value 1 for banks in the highest (lowest) decile and capital Buffer 
(BUFF) as a independent variable. 
This research findings are fairly robust and quite unequivocal. 
After controlling for other potential determinants of the surplus 
capital, this research found a robustly significant negative relationship 
between the business cycle and capital buffers. The result was 
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showing that ROE has positive correlation and NPL has a negative 
correlation. The signs of the dummy variables BIG and SMA are, 
respectively, consistent with the too big to fail hypothesis and the 
relatively greater difficulties for small banks to draw on capital 
markets. 
3. Francesco d’Avack and Sandrine Levasseur (2007) 
This research anylize the determinants of capital buffers in 
CEECs (Central and Eastern European Countries), using a dynamic 
panel-analysis based on country-level data for CEECs. The research 
try to use lag of Capial Buffer (BUFFt-1), Return On Equity (ROE), 
Non Performing Loan (NPL), and Business cycle (GDP growth) as 
independent variables, and Capital Buffer (BUFF) as dependent 
variable.  
The results was showing a positive significant adjustment costs 
lag of Capial Buffer (BUFFt-1) in determining capital buffer, Return 
on Equity (ROE) also has a positive effect in influencing capital 
buffer. But Non Performing Loan (NPL), and GDP’s growth has 
significant negative relationship to capital Buffer. 
The main results are as follows. First, there are large and 
significant adjustment costs in raising capital. Second, banks behave 
pro-cyclically, depleting their buffers in upturns to benefit from 
unanticipated investment opportunities. Third, there is a significant 
negative relationship between current levels of non-performing loans 
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(NPL) and capital buffers, suggesting that banks in CEECs are risk-
takers. Banking sectors with large past NPL however tend to have 
larger buffers. Finally, the access to external capital may appear still 
somewhat limited, with banks relying on internally generated funds to 
raise buffers. 
4. Miguel Boucinha (2008) 
Miguel Bouchinha try to analyze the determinants of Portuguese 
banks’ capital buffers. The dataset used for estimation covers 17 
Portuguese banks from 1994 to 2004. This research use Non 
Performing loan (NPLi,t), variance of profits (VPROV), Bank's Size 
(Size), output gap to potential output (YGAP), Bank's merger 
(Merger), the weight of volatile income financial assets in banks’ total 
assets (STK), the change in the Lisbon Stock Exchange general index 
(PSIG) as independent variables, and lag of capital buffer (BUFFt-1) as 
dependent variable.  
The results were showing that Non Performing Loan (NPLi,t), 
Variance of Profits (VPROV), Bank's Size (Size), output gap to 
potential output (YGAP), Bank's Merger (Merger) has negative 
significant effect to BUFFi,t. The weight of volatile income financial 
assets in banks’ total assets(STK), General stock market index (PSIG) 
has positive significant effect to BUFFi,t. Merger has no effect to 
BUFFi,t.  
 
 
39 
   
The main findings are that the capital buffer is positively 
influenced by several broad risk measures, suggesting that the 
introduction of the more sensitive regulation in Basel II might not 
affect Portuguese banks’ capital ratios as much as one could expect. 
Provisions and high and stable profitability are found to be substitutes 
for capital buffers, whereas larger banks seem to hold less excess 
capital. A negative business cycle effect is also found, and several 
other hypotheses are tested. 
5. Terhi Jokipii and Alistair Milne (2006) 
This research analyze the cyclical behaviour of European bank 
capital buffer’s bank of Finland, it using an unbalanced panel of 
commercial, savings and co-operative banks for the years 1997 to 
2004, specifically control for potential determinants of capital buffer 
in order to analyze the sign and the magnitude of the eefect that 
business cycle has on capital buffer fluctuations.  
The results highlight a distinct difference that appears to exit 
between banks operative in the recently accessed member states 
(RAM) and 25 banks those of the European Union 25 (EU25), and 
euro area 15 (EA15). 
The evidence indicated the capital buffers of the RAM banks 
appear to have a significant positive relationship with the cycle, while 
for those in the EU15 and the EA and the combined EU25 the 
relationship is significantly negative. The research also distinguish 
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between type and size of banks, and find comercial and saving banks 
as well as large banks move counter cyclically. The other finding was 
showing that saving banks and smaller banks drive the negative effect 
or move pro cyclically for the EU25, EU15, and EA samples. 
6. Benjamin M. Tabak et all (2011) 
This research analyze about bank capital buffers, lending growth 
and economic eycle and it is using empirical evidence for Banks in 
Brazil. The research used an unbalanced quarterly panel data of 134 
banks, from 2000 to 2010. Return On Equity (ROE), Non Performing 
Loans (NPL), Bank's Size (SIZE), Economic cycle (GAPt-1) used as 
dependend variables and capital buffer used as independent variable. 
The results were proving a negative significant Return On 
Equity, Non Performing Loan, Size, and output gap (economic cycle) 
on influencing capital buffers. It means that banks in Brazil move pro-
cyclically behavior since economic cycle has negative effect to capital 
buffer, in other word banks in Brazil try to increase their capital buffer 
while economics condition is downturn.  
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Tabel 2.1 
Summary of Previous Researches 
 
 
Researchers Title Variables Analysist  Method  Results 
Agustinus 
Prasetyantoko, 
Wahyoe 
Soedarmono 
(2010) 
Determinanats  
Of Capital 
Buffer Banking 
in Indonesia 
Dependent Variables : 
Capital Buffer (BUFF) 
Independent variables:  
Size (Ln Total Assets), 
Loan Loss Provision 
(LLP), Ex-ante risk 
(LNSDROA), return 
On Equity (ROE), 
Return on Assets 
(ROA), Non Interest 
Income (NNI), 
Financing from 
financial Mareket 
(MD), bank's Monopoly 
Power (MPOW), Loan's 
growth to Total Assets 
(VLOAN), GDp growth 
(GDPG), Indonesia 
banking Architecture 
(IBA), Single Presence 
Policy (SPP), Rule of 
law (LAW), corruption 
Index (CORRUPT), 
governance 
effectiveness (GOV) 
Multiple 
Linear 
Regression 
From the 
analysis based 
on the bank by 
asset size, 
indicated that 
for small banks, 
capital buffer 
was positively 
related to the 
cost of equity, 
non-interest 
income, control 
of corruption, 
and government 
intervention. 
While the 
capital buffer 
will go down if 
the size of 
assets, ex-post 
credit risk, 
financing from 
the financial 
markets, credit 
growth, 
economic 
growth, and the 
rule of law 
increases. 
For large banks, 
capital buffer 
will be increased 
if the ex-post 
credit risk, the 
cost of equity, 
retained 
earnings, market 
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forces, 
economic 
growth and 
improved 
control of 
corruption. 
Meanwhile, the 
only financing 
from financial 
markets and 
government 
interventions 
that can reduce 
the capital 
reserves of 
banks.  
Ayuso et all 
(2002) 
The 
relationship 
between the 
Spanish 
Business Cycle 
and The 
Capital Buffers 
Held by 
Spanish 
Commercial 
and Savings 
Banks 
Dependent variable: 
BUFF  
Independent variables:   
BUFFt-1, Return On 
Equity (ROE), Non 
Performing Loan 
(NPL), BIG, SMA, and 
GDP. 
BIG and SMA are 
included to detect 
differences in the buffer 
according to the size of 
each institution. In 
particular, BIG (SMA) 
is a dummy variable. 
 
Multiple 
Linear 
Regression 
This research 
found a robustly 
significant 
negative 
relationship 
between the 
business cycle 
and capital 
buffers. The 
result was 
showing that 
ROE has 
positive 
correlation and 
NPL has a 
negative 
correlation. The 
signs of the 
dummy 
variables BIG 
and SMA are, 
respectively, 
consistent with 
the too big to 
fail hypothesis 
and the 
relatively 
greater 
difficulties for 
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small banks to 
draw on capital 
markets. 
Francesco 
d’Avack and 
Sandrine 
Levasseur 
(2007) 
The 
Determinants 
of Capital 
Buffers in 
CEECs 
(Central and 
Eastern 
European 
Countries)  
Dependent variable: 
BUFF  
Independent variables:   
BUFFt-1, Return On 
Equity, Non Performing 
Loan, and Growth of 
GDP 
Multiple 
Linear 
Regression 
The results was 
showing a 
positive 
significant 
adjustment 
costs (BUFFt-1) 
in determining 
capital buffer, 
Return on 
Equity (ROE) 
also has a 
positive effect 
in influencing 
capital buffer. 
But Non 
Performing 
Loan (NPL), 
and GDP’s 
growth has 
significant 
negative 
relationship to 
capital Buffer. 
 
It was indicating 
as follows. First, 
there are large 
and significant 
adjustment costs 
in raising 
capital. Second, 
banks behave 
pro-cyclically, 
depleting their 
buffers in 
upturns to 
benefit from 
unanticipated 
investment 
opportunities. 
Third, there is a 
significant 
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negative 
relationship 
between current 
levels of non-
performing 
loans (NPLs) 
and capital 
buffers, 
suggesting that 
banks in CEECs 
are risk-takers. 
Banking sectors 
with large past 
NPLs however 
tend to have 
larger buffers. 
Finally, the 
access to 
external capital 
may appear still 
somewhat 
limited, with 
banks relying on 
internally 
generated funds 
to raise buffers. 
 
 
Miguel 
Boucinha 
(2008) 
The 
Determinants 
Of Portuguese 
Banks’ Capital 
Buffers  
Dependent variable: 
BUFFi,t 
Independent variables: 
Non Performing loan 
(NPLi,t), variance of 
profits (VPROV), 
Bank's Size (Size), 
output gap to potential 
output (YGAP), Bank's 
merger (Merger), the 
weight of volatile 
income financial assets 
in banks’ total assets 
(STK), the change in 
the Lisbon Stock 
Exchange general index 
Multiple 
Linear 
Regression 
The results were 
showing that 
non Performing 
Loan (NPL1i,t), 
Variance of 
Profits 
(VPROV), 
Bank's Size 
(Size), output 
gap to potential 
output (YGAP), 
and Bank's 
Merger 
(Merger) has 
negative 
significant effect 
to BUFFi,t. The 
weight of 
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(PSIG) volatile income 
financial assets 
in banks’ total 
assets(STK), 
General stock 
market index 
(PSIG) has 
positive 
significant effect 
to BUFFi,t. 
Merger has no 
effect to 
BUFFi,t.  
The main 
findings are that 
the capital 
buffer is 
positively 
influenced by 
several broad 
risk measures, 
suggesting that 
the introduction 
of the more 
sensitive 
regulation in 
Basel II might 
not affect 
Portuguese 
banks’ capital 
ratios as much 
as one could 
expect. 
Provisions and 
high and stable 
profitability are 
found to be 
substitutes for 
capital buffers, 
whereas larger 
banks seem to 
hold less excess 
capital. A 
negative 
business cycle 
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effect is also 
found, and 
several other 
hypotheses are 
tested. 
Terhi Jokipii 
and Alistair 
Milne (2006) 
The Cyclical 
Behaviour of 
European 
Bank Capital 
Buffers  
Dependent variable: 
Capital Ratio - National 
Regulatory Minimum 
Reserve (BUFF)  
Independent variables:    
return on equity ROE), 
risk ratio of non-
performing loans to 
total loans (NPL), loan-
loss provisions over 
total asset (RISK2), log 
of total assets (size ), 
post-tax profit over 
total assets (profit), 
annual loan growth 
(Δloan ), loans over 
total assets (net loans ),  
gdp domestic and sub-
sample GDP growth 
(GDP), and HP filtered 
real GDP series (output 
gap) 
Multiple 
Linear 
Regression 
The evidence 
indicated the 
capital buffers 
of the RAM 
banks appear to 
have a 
significant 
positive 
relationship 
with the cycle, 
while for those 
in the EU15 and 
the EA and the 
combined EU25 
the relationship 
is significantly 
negative. The 
research also 
distinguish 
between type 
and size of 
banks, and find 
comercial and 
saving banks as 
well as large 
banks move 
counter 
cyclically. The 
other finding 
was showing 
that saving 
banks and 
smaller banks 
drive the 
negative effect 
or move pro 
cyclically for 
the EU25, 
EU15, and EA 
samples. 
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Benjamin M. 
Tabak et all 
(2011) 
Bank Capital 
Buffers, 
Lending 
Growth and 
Economic 
Cycle: 
Empirical 
Evidence For 
Brazil 
Dependent variable: 
BUFF  
Independent variables:    
Return On Equity 
(ROE), Non Performing 
Loans (NPL), bank's 
Size (SIZE), Economic 
cycle (GAPt-1) 
Multiple 
Linear 
Regression 
The results were 
showing a 
negative 
significant  
correlation of 
Return On 
Equity, Non 
Performing 
Loan, Size, 
output gap 
(economic 
cycle) on 
determining 
capital buffers.  
It means that 
banks in Brazil 
move pro-
cyclically 
behavior since 
economic cycle 
has negative 
effect to capital 
buffer, in other 
word banks in 
Brazil try to 
increase their 
capital buffer 
while economics 
condition is 
downturn.  
     
 
 
2.3  Research’s Model and Hypotesis 
This study aims to determines the factors that affect the capital buffer of 
comercial banks in Indonesia. The author formulates the problem to be discussed 
as well as limit the scope so that this discussion can more be focused. This study 
also choose  research model as well as the appropriate analytical methods to be 
used in order to achieve the objectives of this study. Then, the author will collect 
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the necessary data and process these data with the model of research, analysis and 
statistical methods that have been determined. In the end, the author will draw 
conclusions from the results of analysis. 
The data required in this study consisted of the factors influenced to affect 
the capital buffer of comercial banks in Indonesia as well as financial data bank 
which was considered to describe the bank's financial performance. The factors 
that affect the capital buffer are including cost of holding capital that proxy by 
Return on Equity (ROE t-1), cost of bankcruptcy which proxy by credit risk or non 
performing loan (NPL), cost of capital adjustment which proxy by Increment of 
Capital Buffer (∆BUFF), and other determinants such as Loans to Total Assets 
(VLOAN), and Bank's Share Assets (BSA). 
 
2.3.1. The Influence of Cost of Holding Capital proxy by Return on Equity 
(ROEt-1) toward Capital Buffer Banking in Indonesia 
Based on Alfon et al. (2004), Ayuso et al. (2004), and Jokipii and Milne 
(2008), they use return on equity (ROE) as a proxy for the cost of holding capital 
or cost of financing. They use this proxy because when banks holding capital, it 
will implie direct costs of remunerating the excess of capital. The cost of equity is 
used to proxy cost of capital because it’s more challenging to calculate as equity 
does not pay a set return to its investors. One of the determinant of Cost of equity 
is the expected Total Share Return (TSR) when investing in the company, is 
measured by looking at the past ROE of the company over the period t-1.The past 
of ROE might prove to be a very poor indicator of the future, this is the reason 
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why a through analysis of the company’s future projects should be undertaken, 
and would probably yield better predictions than a mere extrapolation of past 
numbers. 
The finding show a negative relation between ROE and capital buffer. De 
Bondt and Prast (1999) also find that ROE is only negative and significant in 
countries with large stock markets (the United States, the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands) suggesting that the argument of “opportunity cost of capital” holds 
only in countries were shareholder value is important and access to external 
finance relatively cheap. As noted by Jokipii and Milne (2008), ROE may well 
exceed the remuneration demanded by shareholders and to this extent is a measure 
of revenue rather than cost. A high level of earnings substitutes for capital as a 
buffer against unexpected shocks. Thus, as raising capital through the capital 
markets is costly, retained earnings are frequently used to increase capital buffers. 
So the expected sign for ROE may be negative (Jokipii and Milne, 2008), but it 
also may be positive (Nier and Baumman, 2006). 
Moreover, when there are information asymmetries, a significant 
proportion of fluctuations in bank earnings is kept as retained earnings, and 
increases in earnings will spark increases in capital ratio, so we can expect a 
positive relation between ROE and capital. Consistent with this argument, Berger 
(1995), Nier and Baumann (2006), and Francesco d’Avack and Sandrine 
Levasseur (2007) find a positive relation between ROE and cost of capital. The 
opposing arguments and mixed empirical evidence lead us to include ROE as a 
control variable. 
 
 
50 
   
H1 : Return on Equity (ROEt-1) is more likely to give negative 
influence on Capital Buffer 
2.3.2 The Effect of  Bankruptcy Costs or Financial Distress Proxy by Non 
Performing Loan (NPL) toward Capital Buffer Banking in Indonesia 
The risk profile of each institution is proxied by NPL, which measures the 
non performing loans ratio (ratio of non performing loans to total loans). This is 
an ex post measurement of the risks assumed by the institution and, therefore, the 
theory predicts this coefficient should be positive since higher risks increase the 
probability of meeting regulatory capital constraints and facing the related costs 
such as market discipline and supervisory intervention (Furfine, 2000; Estrella, 
2004). Riskier banks should therefore raise capital. A negative coefficient 
however would indicate "moral hazard” behaviour, where banks assume higher 
risks with lower buffers. It could also indicate more sophisticated risk 
management systems, allowing banks to hold lower buffers for the same amount 
of risk (Alfón et al., 2005). 
H2 : Non Performing Loan (NPL) is more likely to give positive 
influence on Capital Buffer 
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2.3.2. The Effect of  Adjustment Cost proxy by Increment of Capital Buffer 
(∆BUFF)toward Capital Buffer Banking in Indonesia 
As argued by Ayuso et al. (2002) and Estrella (2004), lag of Capital Buffer 
(BUFFt-1) coefficient may be interpreted as a measure of adjustment costs in 
capital buffers. The lagged endogenous is introduced to reflect the presence of 
adjustment costs in attaining the desired level of capital for banks and its expected 
sign is thus positive. Since the capital buffer decissions not only determined by 
adjusting capital buffer in the period before (t-1), but also determinded by capital 
buffer in this perode (t), so the right variable for capital adjustment is increment of 
capital buffer by seeing decreasing or increasing of the turning point. 
H3 :  Increment of Capital Buffer (∆BUFF) is more likely to give 
positive influence on Capital Buffer 
2.3.3. The Effect of Other Determinants (Loans to Total Assets, and Bank’s 
Share Assets) toward Capital Buffer Banking in Indonesia 
The loans’ to total assets ratio (VLOAN) are also considered in the 
analysis. VLOAN expected to relate positively to Capital Buffer (BUFF). 
Eventhough Prasetyantoko and Soedarmono (2010) showed the negative impact 
of VLOAN toward Capital Buffer (BUFF), this suggests that the more bank 
distribute their credit, the smaller level of capital buffer being reserved. But this 
research agree with positive corelation between Loans to Total Assets and Capital 
Buffer, it’s come from the logic of bank risk. Simple logic that we can imply is 
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the higher Loans to Total Assets value, the riskier banks will face, since banks 
investing their business more in credit.  
This research also agree with Too Big To Fail consesus that states large 
bank prefer to maintain low capital buffer. Large bank can be seen from Bank’s 
Share Assets value, which banks with high share assets mean they have big total 
assets, or in the other word, it can be included to category of large bank. Very 
clear prediction has been reached, where large banks tend to have lower capital 
ratios than small banks, due to the nature of the Too Big To Fail (TBTF) (Mishkin 
2006). Large banks has a comparative advantage to address the problem 
information to improve monitoring efforts encourage them to strike the cost of 
equity. In turn, banks will reduce the cost of equity by way of lower capital 
reserves.  
H4 : Loans to Total Assets (VLOAN) is more likely to give positive 
influence on Capital Buffer 
H5 : Banks Share Assets (BSA) is more likely to give negative 
influence on Capital Buffer. 
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Some of the variables described above can serve as a model of this study 
as follows: 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROE (-) 
NPL (+) 
∆ BUFF (+) 
Loan’s to Total 
Assets (+) 
CAPITAL 
BUFFER 
Bank’s Share 
Assets (-) 
 
2.3.4. Research Hypotesis  
Based on previous research and conceptual framework above, then the 
hypothesis is developed as follows: 
H1 : Return on Equity (ROEt-1) is more likely to give negative influence on 
Capital  Buffer 
H2 : Non Performing Loan (NPL) is more likely to give positive influence on 
Capital Buffer 
H3 : Increment of Capital Buffer (∆BUFF) is more likely to give positive 
influence on Capital Buffer 
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H4 : Loans to Total Assets (VLOAN) is more likely to give positive influence on 
Capital Buffer 
H5 : Banks Share Assets (BSA) is more likely to give negative influence on 
Capital Buffer 
CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
3.1 Research Variables 
  Research variable is an attribute that has a particular variant to be learned 
and to be drawn the conclusions from it. This study used two types of variables, 
these are input variables and output variables. Input variable is a independent 
variable, or in this case is the factors that affect the input to the banks’ capital 
buffer. And the output variable is the capital buffer itself. 
Input and output variables used in this study was based on the literature 
review and in accordance with the established hypothesis. Research variables used 
in this research are: 
a. Independent variables consist of: 
1. Return on Equity (ROEt-1) 
2. Non Performing Loan (NPL) 
3. Increment of Capital Buffer (∆BUFF) 
4. Loans to Total Assets (VLOAN) 
5. Bank’s Share Assets (BSA) 
b. Dependent variable used in this research is Capital Buffer (BUFF) 
 
 
 
55 
 
56 
 
3.1.1. Independent Variables 
The following are operational definitions of each variable: 
1. Return on Equity 
Riyadi (2004) defined Return on Equity as the ratio of income after tax 
divided to core capital. Rivai, et al. (2007), Return on Equity is an indicator that 
it's important for shareholders and potential investors to measure the ability of 
banks to earn net income in dividends. The increase in this ratio means an 
increase in net income from earnings and will affect the probability associated 
with dividend payments (especially for banks that have been going public).  
Return on equity (ROE) measures the rate of return on the ownership 
interest (shareholders' equity) of the common stock owners. It measures a firm's 
efficiency at generating profits from every unit of shareholders' equity (also 
known as net assets or assets minus liabilities). ROE shows how well a company 
uses investment funds to generate earnings growth. Level of ROE between 15% 
and 20% are considered desirable. 
Formula: 
 ROE t-1 =  Income After Tax t-1.................................................................(1) 
                           Shareholder Equity t-1 
 
2. Non Performing Loans (NPL) 
Non-performing loans (NPL) is the level of risk faced by banks. NPL is 
the number of troubled loans and may not be billed. The more greater value of 
Non Performing loan the more worse bank's performance (Mohammed, 2005). 
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Bank Indonesia regulation stated limit of NPL (Non Performing Loan) on 
the Bank is 5%. According to IMF, A loan is nonperforming when payments of 
interest and principal are past due by 90 days or more, or at least 90 days of 
interest payments have been capitalized, refinanced or delayed by agreement, or 
payments are less than 90 days overdue, but there are other good reasons to doubt 
that payments will be made in full. 
By Bank regulatory definition, non-performing loans consist of other real 
estate owned which is that taken by foreclosure or a deed in lieu of foreclosure, 
loans that are 90 days or more past due and still accruing interest, and loans which 
have been placed on nonaccrual (i.e., loans for which interest is no longer accrued 
and posted to the income statement). non-performing loans (NPL) is the ratio of 
total nonperforming loans to total loans. This ratio is defined as follows (SE BI 
6/73/INTERN DPNP No date December 24, 2004): 
         NPL = Total non Performing Loan..............................................................(2) 
                  Total Loans 
 
3. The Increment of Capital Buffer (∆BUFF) 
The adjusting capital proxy by the increment of capital buffer (∆BUFF) is 
likely to decrease in capital buffers or has negative corelation toward capital 
buffer. ∆BUFF also has similliarity with lag of capital buffer, it is measured as the 
excess of capital over regulatory requirements in the period now (t) minus capital 
over regulatory in the periode one year before (t-1). 
 
∆BUFF = BUFFt – BUFFt-1   ....................................................................... (3) 
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4. Loans to Total Assets (VLOAN) 
The Loans to Total Assets ratio measures the total loans outstanding as a 
percentage of total assets. The higher this ratio indicates a bank is loaned up and 
its liquidity is low. The higher the ratio, the more risky a bank may be to higher 
defaults. This figure is determined as follows: 
             Loans to Total Assets =  Total Loans...............................................(4) 
                                                     Total Assets  
 
5. Bank’s Share Assets 
Banks with substantial market power relatively maintain their low capital 
buffer. There are several reasons to expect a negative relationship between the 
banks’ monopoly power and its capital level. The main reasons is according to 
Too Big To Fail hypothesis, advantages in the access to capital (Berger and Udell, 
2004), and if there are economies of scale in screening and monitoring borrowers, 
then large banks may substitute excess of capital with these activities (Jokipii and 
Milne, 2008). Bank's Share Assets defined as the ratio of total bank assets to the 
total banking system assets. 
             BSA     =         Total Bank Assets ..........................................................(5) 
                               Total Banking System Assets 
 
3.1.2. Dependent Variable 
Banks' capital capital buffer (BUFF) is defined as the difference between 
the CAR ratio (ratio the adequacy of bank capital) to the regulatory capital 
minimum of 8%. From Qfinance Dictionary, capital buffer is the amount of 
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capital a financial institution needs to hold above minimum requirements, 
calculated on an assessment of forecast risk. 
            BUFF = CAR ratio – Minimum Regulatory Requirement (8%) ..............(6) 
 
Table 3.1 
Operational Definition 
Variable Definition Formula Scale 
Return on Equity 
(ROE t-1) 
The ratio of income after 
tax period t-1 divided to 
equity capital period t-1. 
    Income After Taxt-1 
  Shareholder Equityt-1 
 
In 
precentage 
(%) 
Non Performing 
Loan (NPL)  
The ratio of total 
nonperforming loans to 
total loans 
        Total NPL 
      Total Loans 
 
In 
precentage 
(%) 
The Increment of 
Capital Buffer 
(∆BUFF) 
 
Capital Buffer on the 
period now (t) minus 
capital buffer on the 
period before (t-1)  
 
BUFFt – BUFFt-1 
 
In 
precentage 
(%) 
Loans to Total 
Assets (VLOAN) 
Ratio measures the total 
loans outstanding as a 
percentage of total assets 
Total Loans 
Total Assets 
 
In 
precentage 
(%) 
Bank’s Share 
Assets (BSA) 
The ratio of total bank 
assets of the total 
banking system assets. 
Total Bank Assets 
Total Banking System 
Assets 
 
Precentage
(%) 
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Capital Buffer 
(BUFF) 
The difference between 
the CAR ratio (ratio the 
adequacy of bank 
capital) to the regulatory 
capital minimum of 8% 
CAR ratio – Minimum 
Regulatory Requirement 
(8%) 
In 
precentage 
(%) 
 
3.2 Population dan Sample 
The data used in this study is secondary data from longitudinal data or a 
group of individual data includes data 16 biggest banks in the market share of 
Third Party Funds (TPF) are: 
a. Have a total value of deposits of at least 12 trillion in 2004 and at least 16 
trillion in 2010. 
b. Object of study in Indonesia examined the banking industry during years 
2004-2010. The reason the use of these data as research data for the 16 
largest commercial banks are controlled more than 75 percent share of 
total market share of existing commercial banks, so that samples can be 
considered to represent the banking industry as well. The reason the time 
period was chosen as the study time period start from 2004 was due 
Indonesian Banking Architecture (API) program start being implemented 
in that year, and in this research border until year of 2010 because of 
recent data that researchers can get is 2010. 
The data used is a data of performance bank indicators that include the 
total assets, total deposits and total loans contained in the balance sheet and 
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financial ratios of banks that were subjected to experiments. Data obtained from 
the financial statement’s commercial bank publications of Bank Indonesia and 
some of the data obtained from the website address of the bank concerned. As 
well as other information that is relevant to the issues to be investigated. Banks 
that were subjected to experiments can be seen in the table below. 
 
Table 3.2 List of Banks (Research Objects) 
Bank Persero BUSN Devisa Bank Asing 
Bank Mandiri Bank Central Asia CITIBANK 
Bank Rakyat Indonesia Bank Danamon HSBC 
Bank Negara Indonesia Bank Internasional Indonesia  
Bank Tabungan Negara Bank Permata  
 Bank CIMB Niaga  
 PAN Indonesia Bank  
 Bank Mega  
 Bank OCBC NISP  
 Bank UOB Buana  
 Bank Bukopin  
Source: Bank Indonesia 
 
3.3 Types and Source Data 
Type of data used in this study is the type of secondary data, the research 
data obtained indirectly. Secondary data is data which has been collected by data 
compiler (institute) and published to public and data user. The availability of 
secondary data would make this study easier and quicker. Company resource or 
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archive, government publication, industry analysis offered by the media, website, 
the internet are incude in secondary data (Sekaran, 2000). In this research, 
secondary data obrtained by collecting data from books, magazines article, 
journal, and also website related to which has been selected, such as annual 
reports published from the period January 2004 untill December 2010. 
 
3.4 Data Collection Method 
1. Indirect Observation 
Performed by opening the website and downloading of the object under 
study, so as to obtain the financial statements, an overview of the bank and its 
development. The sites used were: 
a. www.bi.go.id  
b. www.infobank.co.id  
c. www.idx.com 
 
2. Literature Study 
Literature Study was done by collecting information from books, journals, 
magazines, and internet which has correlation with research. 
 
3.5. Data Analysis 
This research will use quantitative analytical methods. Quantitative 
analysis utilizing analyzer having the character of quantitative. Analyzer having 
the character of quantitative is analyzer using models, like mathematics model, 
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statistical model, and econometrics. The result presented in the form of number 
then explained and interpreted in a description. 
Quantitative analysis that will be used in his research include test classical 
asumption test and multiple linear regression analysis. 
 
3.5.1. Classical Assumptions tests  
 Testing of the classic assumptions made to ensure that autocorrelation, 
multicollinearity, and heterocedasticity normally  distributed (Ghozali, 2001).  
Assumptions of classical test consists of: 
a) Normality test 
The purpose of normality test is to whether in a regression model, 
dependent variable, independent variables or both are  having normal distribution 
or near come to normal (Ghozali,2009). Normality detection is done by seeing 
normal chart of probability plot. The decission making base is as follows: 
i) If data disseminates around the diagonal line and follows the direction of 
diagonal line, then the regression model  fulfills normality assumption. 
ii) If data disseminates far from the diagonal line and does not follows the 
direction of diagonal line, then the regression  model does not fulfills 
normality assumption. 
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b) Heteroscedasticity Test 
This test aims to see the spread of data. This test can be done by looking at 
the chart plot between the predicted value of  the variable independent (ZPRED) 
with residualnya (SRESID). If the graph is not a regular pattern teredapat then 
identified there is no heteroscedasticity. 
 
c)  Multicollinearity Test 
The purpose of multicollinearity test is to examine whether or not a 
regression model contains correlation between  independent variables. if it 
happened, the correlation problem will be recognized as multicollinearity 
problem. A good  regression model should not contain any multicollinearity 
problem (Ghozali, 2009). Indocator of a regression model which are  from 
multicollinearity are VIF (variance inflation factor) value less than 10, or 
Tolerance value less than 1.  
 
d) Autocorrelation Test 
This test was used to test the assumptions of classical regression relating in 
the presence of autocorrelation. This test uses the model Durbin - Watson (DW 
test). If the DW is located between the upper limit or upper bound (du) and (4 - 
du)  meaning it has met the assumptions of classical regression or mean there is 
no autocorrelation. 
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3.5.2  Multiple Linear Regression Analysis  
In this study using the method of multiple linear regression analysis 
(Multiple linear regression method). Multiple  regression analysis is used to 
determine the closeness of the relationship between capital buffer (dependent 
variable) with the factors that influence it (the variable independent). The equation 
model of regression which will be tested areas follows:  
Capital Buffer (BUFF) = a + b1x1+ b2x2+b3x3 + b4x4 + b5x5 + E 
Where, 
a = constant 
b1 – b6 = regression coefficient of each variable 
X1 =Return on Equity (ROEt-1) 
X2 = Non Performing Loan (NPL) 
X3 = Increment of Capital Buffer (∆BUFF) 
X4 = Loans to Total Assets (VLOAN)  
X5 = Bank’s Share Assets (BSA) 
E = error term (confounding variables) or residual 
 
3.5.3. Hypothesis Test 
a. T test 
The purpose of this test is to determine whether each independent variable 
affects the variables significantly dependent.  Tests performed by t-test, 
comparing the count with a t-table.  This test performed with the following 
requirements: 
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• If t-table < t calculated < t-table, then H0 is accepted independent 
variables had no effect on the variable dependent 
• If the t calculaed > t-table or t calculated > t-table, then H0 denied the 
means of independent variables affect significant effect  on the dependent 
variable. Testing can also be done through observation of the t significance 
level α used (this study 
using α level of 5%). The analysis is based on comparison between the value of 
significance with a significance value of t  0.05, where the terms are as follows: 
• If the significance of t < 0.05 then H0 is rejected, which means 
independent variables significantly influence the dependent variable 
• If the significance of t > 0.05 H0 accepted then the variable no 
independent effect on the dependent variable. 
 
b. F Test 
This test aims to determine whether the variables simultaneously or 
independently together significantly affect the dependent variable. This test using 
the F test, by comparig result of the F calculated to F table. The test is performed 
with the following  requirements: 
• If F calculated < F table, then H0 is accepted variables simultaneous 
independent no effect of the dependent variable 
• If F calculated > F table, then H0 rejected the variables simultaneous 
independent effect on the dependent variable. 
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Testing can also be done through observation of the F significance level α 
used (this study using α level of 5%). The  analysis is based on comparison 
between the significance of F with a significance value 0.05, where the terms are 
as follows: 
• If the significance of F < 0.05, H0 is rejected, which means independent 
variables simultaneously influence of the dependent variable 
• If the significance of F > 0.05, H0 is accepted variables simultaneous 
independent no effect of the dependent variable. 
 
3.5.4. Testing the accuracy of the estimated model (Goodness of Fit Test) 
The purpose of this testing is to test the level of closeness or relationship 
between the dependent variable with independent  variables that could seen from 
the large value of the coefficient of determination (Adjusted R-Square). If the 
Adjusted R-Square value closer to 1, then the level closeness or relationship also 
higher. (Ghozali, 2001). 
